On 6 November 2026, Gabon’s Minister of Trade, Industry and Processing, Emmanuel Eyeghe Nze, signed a memorandum of understanding with Zhang He, chairman of China’s South Manganese Investment Limited, for a manganese processing project valued at CFA116.7 billion, roughly $207 million. The facility will process ore from the M’Bembele deposit in the Ndjolé region, starting at 180,000 tonnes a year and scaling to 1.08 million tonnes annually from 2030. The agreement covers ore beneficiation, energy supply and the logistics infrastructure needed to support processing operations.
The signing was not an isolated transaction. It was the operational expression of a policy decision Gabon had already taken that from January 2029, the country will ban raw manganese exports. The processing plant is what the ban is meant to make viable, a domestic industrial anchor that gives Gabon a place in the manganese value chain beyond the extraction of ore. President Brice Lotaire Oligui Nguema’s government has set a target of establishing Gabon as a regional centre for manganese processing by 2029. The ambition as stated is to “increase the value generated from its manganese resources rather than relying primarily on the export of unprocessed ore”.
The logic is straightforward, and it echoes across the continent. Africa holds roughly 30 per cent of the world’s mineral reserves but captures a far smaller share of the downstream value. For manganese specifically, South Africa holds about 70 per cent of global high-grade reserves and accounts for 37 per cent of worldwide ore production, yet refines only 14 per cent of that output inside its borders. China processes approximately 87 per cent of the world’s critical battery minerals. The gap between extraction and processing is where the economic value concentrates, and where African governments have increasingly decided they want a larger share.
Gabon’s manganese push sits within a broader Chinese reorientation of its African minerals’ strategy. A report tracking Chinese investments across 32 mining, exploration and development projects in 15 African countries up to June 2026 found $41.2 billion in commitments, of which $16.3 billion across 19 projects involved mineral value addition; processing or manufacturing resources within Africa. The pattern is visible fro0m Nigeria’s $250 million Chinese-built lithium processing plant in Nasarawa State, which opened in July 2026, to Zimbabwe’s $400 million lithium sulphate facility built by Huayou, which shipped its first batches in April 2026. In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa used the September 2026 BRICS summit to call on Chinese industrial partners to build domestic battery mineral refining plants, leveraging the country’s manganese endowment.
Beijing’s motive is not exactly altruistic. Chinese battery and chemical producers face intensifying trade barriers in Western markets. US rules under the Inflation Reduction Act exclude subsidies for battery packs containing Chinese-refined material, and tariff measures have hit South African manufacturers after Washington imposed 30 per cent import duties on selected South African industrial shipments in 2025. Sourcing refined chemical salts from African facilities allows Chinese manufacturers to diversify processing nodes while retaining operational co0ntrol over downstream precursor production. Africa becomes, in this architecture, a geographic workaround for Western trade policy, a processing jurisdiction that is neither China nor a western ally, and therefore less exposed to the tariff and subsidy exclusions that apply to Chinese-sourced material.
That does not make the investment worthless to Gabon. A processing plant creates construction jobs, permanent industrial employment, demand for electricity and logistics, and a domestic tax base that raw ore exports do not generate. It also builds technical skills that can, in principle, be redeployed across other mineral value chains. The $207 million commitment is real capital, and the processing capacity, 1.08 million tonnes annually b7y 2030, is not a token pilot. If Gabon can process its manganese domestically, it captures the beneficiation margin that currently accrues to refiners in China, and it reduces the volume of low value bulk material leaving its ports.
However, the risks, are structural. A processing plant owned and operated by a Chinese company, sourcing ore from a Chinese-linked mining operation, and selling refined product into Chinese-controlled supply chains is a vertically integrated arrangement in which Gabon supplies the resource, the land, the energy and the regulatory permission, but does not control the technology, the offtake, or the pricing. The processing margin may be booked domestically, but the commercial decisions that determine whether that am4rgin is reinvested, transferred, or priced at arm’s length remain with the investor. The history of African mineral processing, form alumina refineries in Guinea to copper
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